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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of
interest groups on the Indian development effort since
independence. The theoretical framework used is Mancur
Olson's theory that coalitions organize to influence
government policy and the market system to secure benefits
for themselves, impacting productivity and ultimately the
evolution of society itself.
The Indian case study is carried out by examining two
important areas of planned economic growth: the state and
agriculture. In each of these sectors a network of
understanding has been established between the educated,
social and economic elites to share the benefits of
development among themselves. The poor who, with little
social standing, depend almost exclusively on the existing
power structure to represent their interests, have been left
out of this arrangement.
There is evidence to show that interest group action in
India has resulted in the consolidation of vested interests
and a thriving black market in a stagnant economy. As Olson
predicted, this is quite different from the evolution of a
rapidly growing economy and egalitarian society that
economic planners had envisaged.
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Introduction

The following thesis is a case study of the political
economy of independent India.

Its purpose is two-fold.

The

first is to establish that elites of the society have used
official legislation and regulation in a democratic system
to further group interests. The second is to show how such
interest group action has caused economic stagnation and
encouraged a thriving black market, perpetuating existing
social disparities and making the existence of the
underprivileged even more precarious.
Chapter I lays down the theoretical framework of the
thesis.

Mancur Olson's study of coalition action in post-

World War II western democracies is used to discuss why
interest groups organize themselves to influence government
policy and the market.

And further, how this interaction

between the government and interest groups changes the
direction of social evolution, almost always in an manner
unfavorable for growth and for the poor.

This section also

identifies the salient features of Olson's theory which are
distinguishable in the political economy of India.

Detailed

discussion of these attributes will reveal the
correspondence between theory and evidence.

To facilitate

this, the analysis of the Indian case is divided into two
parts: the state and the agricultural sector.
2

These two

3

areas were selected because of their prominent roles in
determining the direction and pace of economic growth.
Under the prevailing socialist ideology, the state dictates
every aspect of development and, in an agrarian economy, the
agricultural sector provides sustenance to the vast majority
of the population.
Chapter II deals with the state in India.

It describes

the political ideology and economic planning that envisaged
a socialist direction to the evolution of society.

To

implement such a development strategy, the state was
empowered with extensive legislative and administrative
powers in the economy.

This provided a strong incentive for

the formation of a coalition

within the state, politicians

and bureaucrats willing to use official authority to
manipulate regulations on behalf of the private sector.
Industrialists and traders have been quick to capitalize on
this situation and have organized an extensive and growing
black market, preserving illegal incomes by transferring a
portion to the state as 'rent1 of post, official positions
that allow administrators considerable discretion in
enforcing the law.

This understanding among the elites has

left the poor out in the cold, prices are artificially
inflated by shortage brokers and for those without much
purchasing power* this means little or no entitlement in the
market.
Chapter III reveals the growth of a second interest

4

group in the agricultural sector.

These are elites who have

used their social standings to promote themselves in the
political hierarchy.

And, a strong political lobby has

allowed them to capture substantial economic advantages as
well.

However, such benefits from the political process

have been at the expense of the poor who have no incentive
to organize themselves in a similar way.

And, with no

political leverage, they continue to rely almost exclusively
on the elite-run power structure for representation of their
interests.
Chapter V concludes by re-identifying the features of
the Indian political economy that correspond with Olson's
theory and that have caused society to evolve as he
predicted.

The elites in India have assimilated and used

their positions to bargain for improvements in their own
situations.

As a result, rather than establishing an

egalitarian society in a growing economy, state regulation
that was specifically targeted for the underprivileged has
actually contributed to the concentration of power and
wealth under retarded growth.

Chapter I
The Impact of Interest Groups

In laying the theoretical framework of the following
discussions, this chapter summarizes Mancur Olson's study of
coalition groups*1 Olson uses evidence from developed
countries to illustrate how interest groups influence the
direction of society, no matter where the process of
evolution initially started.

The following chapters will

show that evidence from the Indian development effort
supports Olson's theory and, as he predicted, although
planned growth was based on a strongly socialist ideology,
interest group intervention in the implementation of
policies has actually perpetuated the inequalities of
society.
Olson's theory begins with the suggestion that groups
with access to selective incentives will be more likely to
act together to obtain collective goods than those who do
not.

He argues that in no country are large groups without

access to selective incentives generally organized: for
example, there are no organizations for the poor or for
those with relatively low incomes.

By contrast, almost

1Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic
Growth. Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982).
5

everywhere the social prestige of the learned professionals
and their limited numbers has helped them to organize.
Moreover, professional organizations are often able to
determine who is Gjualified to practice the profession and
thereby they can control that their selective incentive.
Coalitions use their power to influence government
policy or the market place.

These two influences, Olson

predicts, affect not only efficiency, economic growth and
the exclusion of entrants into society but, also, the
relative importance of different institutions and
activities.
Lobbying by coalitions increases the complexity of
regulation and the. scope of government by creating special
provisions and exceptions.

The more elaborate the

regulation, the greater the need for specialists to deal
with them, such as lawyers, accountants or other
consultants.

When these specialists become significant

enough, there is even the possibility that specialists with
a vested interest in complex regulations will collude or
lobby against the simplification or elimination of the
regulations.

Also, someone has to administer the

increasingly complex regulations that result from lobbying.
This increases the scope of both bureaucracy and government
Olson labels this interaction as 'complex understandings'
among the various agents.
Olson argues that the growth of coalitions with an

7

incentive to try to capture a larger share of national
income and, the increase in regulatory complexity and
governmental action this encourages, alters the pattern of
incentives and the direction of evolution in a society.
Increases in the payoffs from lobbying and cartel activity,
as compared with the payoffs from production, means more
resources are devoted to politics and cartel activity and
fewer devoted to production.

The incentive to produce is

diminished while the incentive to seek a larger share of
what is produced increases.

These changes in the pattern of

incentives deflects the direction of society's evolution.
Olson further suggests that in such an environment, the poor
and unemployed with no incentives to enable them to organize
will suffer the most.

"Every society, whatever its

institutions and governing ideology, gives the greatest
rewards to the fittest-the fittest for that society...(B)ut
no society rewards those who are least fit to thrive under
its arrangements."2
In India, development was initiated by the formulation
of an exhaustive economic plan that closely adhered to the
professed socialist ideology of the government.

There were

two features of underlying importance in this plan.

First,

to ensure rapid economic growth, the state had to assume
responsibility as the initiator and controller of all
economic activity.
2Ibid., 74.

Second, the benefits of state guided

8

growth were to accrue increasingly to the less privileged of
society.

To realize a reduction in inequalities, economic

policy was accompanied by extensive regulations and policy
instruments to prevent the concentration of power and
wealth.

From this initial situation four attributes of

Olson's theory may be identified: an explicitly desired
direction to the evolution of society, complex official
regulations, 'specialists' associated with such regulation
and the selective incentives accessible to these
specialists.
First, nationalist leaders attempted to pave the way
toward an egalitarian, socialist society.

This was the

direction planned economic growth was to take.

Second, the

plan itself established a complexity of regulations in the
economy at the very start of the development process.
Third, to implement these regulations, a large and
authoritative bureaucracy was appointed.

Along with

politicians, they were the 'specialists' equipped to deal
with the elaborate red tape of a highly regulated economy.
Finally, in addition to the power and prestige this gave
politicians and bureaucrats, it also provided them with the
opportunity to earn illegal incomes.

This was the set of

special incentives accessible to the elites.
Later chapters will show how the 'specialists' have
used their positions to preserve and enhance their own
interests.

Clive Crook suggests that in Indian industry, it

is often more important to know which strings to pull than
any business skills.3 The extent of regulations imposed on
private industry has prompted business houses and trading
establishments to use their financial power to escape
legislation via special provisions and exceptions.

This has

been the foundation of the illegal incomes commanded by
bureaucrats and politicians for their specialized skills in
dealing with official restrictions.

There is, therefore, a

reluctance to change the status quo and the state continues
to endorse complex industrial regulations.

The elites have

further guarded their selective incentives and limited entry
into the profession by supporting a bias toward higher
education in the education policy of a country where over
30% are illiterate.4 In agriculture, where the majority of
the votes come from in any election, elites have used their
position to capture political prominence and strong
bargaining power at all levels of government.5 They have
successfully lobbied to secure concessions and subsidies for
the sector in the name of the rural poor.

In reality, these

have been pre-empted by the dominating classes to enhance
their own economic well-being.
3Clive Crook, "Body Politics," Economist. 4 May
1991, p. S8.
4Ibid., S15.
5Over 60% of the population is employed in
agriculture or related activities in the rural sector.
See Michael Todaro, Economic Development in the Third
World (New York: Longman, 1985), 27.
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In India, as in Olson's theory, the growth of groups
with selective incentives, regulation complexities and
government action have had an impact on the pattern of
incentives and attitudes that have evolved in society.
Evading or exploiting regulations, politics and the
bureaucracy and asserting rights through this network has
become far more important than recognizing one's obligations
to society.

As the rewards of corruption have risen,

politicians and bureaucrats have been increasingly reluctant
to revise state regulations and alter the established
'complex understandings'.
For India, this has meant, as Olson predicted, a
complete diversion from the envisaged egalitarian society
with a rapidly expanding economy.

Over 40% of the

population remains below the poverty line and per capita
income has increased at an overall pace of only 1.6% for the
decade 1970-8l.6 The poor, without the social standing or
political clout to come together and assert their rights,
have suffered the most while the educated elites have
consolidated their positions; the rural rich have become
richer? large business houses are stronger and there is a
thriving black market, even in essential consumer products.
In fact, the network of understanding among these elites has
begun to undermine the legitimacy of state authority itself.

6Ibid., 50.
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In the sections below, this thesis will apply Olson's
ideas to the Indian case and examine in detail the
vulnerability of the economy to pressures from the political
economy.

Chapter II
State Guided Development

In Asian Drama. Gunnar Myrdal argued that a plan for
development is in essence a political plan; plan-making,
therefore, is itself a part of the political process in a
country.7 This chapter highlights three such stages in
Indian development planning.

First, the ideology behind the

Indian development plan is described.

Second, the

integration of political ideology into planning, the
development strategy adopted and the policy instruments used
to implement it are discussed.

This process gave the state

the right to reserve extensive autonomy in public affairs
and the enormous power that it assigned itself made it
possible for the state to be not only relatively self
determining but also self-interested.

The third stage

describes how in exercising this power, politicians and
bureaucrats have used official authority to promote and
safeguard their own interests, deflecting the evolution of
society from the essential ideological principles behind
economic planning.

7Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: Pantheon,
1968), 1889.
12
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The Ideology

Post-independence economic planning in India was an
attempt to right the wrongs of colonial rule as soon as
possible.

Nationalist leaders believed that capitalism

could not solve the problem of directing investment to
desired sectors, nor did they believe that free market
forces could alleviate the chronic problems of poverty and
unemployment that faced the country.8 Communism they saw
as antithetical to India's newly won freedom. Inspired by
the Soviet model of planned development and
industrialization, Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress party
leaders sketched a 'middle path' for India, values and
objectives that have been summed up in the phrase 'socialist
pattern of society'.9
A 'socialist pattern of society' meant that the basic
criterion for determining the allocation of resources must
not be private profit but social gain.

The pattern of

development and the structure of socio-economic relations
should be so planned that they result in not only

8Jawaharlal Nehru and the other planners "thought
of imperialism and capitalism as two faces of the Janus
of our time and of nationalism and socialism as the two
weapons of destruction" cited in Mike Shepperdson and
Colin Simmons eds., The Indian National Congress and
the Political Economy of India 1885-1985 (Hampshire,
England: Gower Publishing Group, 1988), 272.
9For a fuller explanation see Government of India,
Second Five Year Plan. (New Delhi: Planning Commission,
1956) .
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appreciable increases in national income and employment, but
also greater equality in incomes and wealth.

As the economy

grew, the benefits of economic development were to accrue
more and more to the relatively less privileged classes of
society and there was to be a progressive reduction of the
concentration of wealth and economic power.10
In pursuit of these goals, the state had to assume the
•commanding heights' of the economy; it had to take on heavy
responsibilities as the principle agency speaking for and
acting on behalf of the community as a whole.
sector of the economy was to expand rapidly.

The public
It had not

only to initiate development which the private sector was
unwilling or unable to undertake; it had also to play the
dominant role in shaping the entire pattern of investment in
the economy, whether it made the investments directly or
whether these were made by the private sector.

The private

sector had to play its part within the framework of the
comprehensive plan accepted by the community.

Private

enterprise, private pricing and private management were
considered mechanisms for the advancement of what were truly
social ends and were thought to be justified only in terms
of social results.
The development of a mixed economy with a strong public
sector, particularly in the key areas of the economy, was
10For a summary of the Second Plan see Government
of India, Approach to the Second Plan (New Delhi:
Planning Commission, 1956).
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viewed as an instrument for achieving the broader objectives
of growth and equity.11 And, to realize these goals, the
consequent neglect of consumer goods industries was seen as
a necessary but temporary sacrifice.

The argument was one

of forced savings and self-reliance: "if you produced
capital goods and steel, thus increasing the share of
investment goods in GNP, that would automatically mean a
higher savings rate since 'one cannot eat steel1."12 This
was regarded as a feasible way to achieve a high rate of
economic growth leading to improvement in living standards
and reduction of inequalities.

It was, in fact, an

accelerated effort to remove poverty at a pace faster than
would be achieved solely through the normal growth
process.13

11The 'key areas' (also referred to as heavy,
core, basic or priority industry) over which the state
had almost complete monopoly included defence,
railways, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, ship
building, communications, banking and, mineral oils.
These areas involved large and lumpy investments and
long gestation periods. Often, as with infrastructure
facilities, benefits are in the form of externalities
which cannot be easily and directly associated with the
investment. However, these industries are a necessary
prerequisite for a program of industrialization. Due
to the scale of capital involved and the uncertainty
regarding profitability, the state was the only agency
in a position to undertake such investment.
12Jagdish Bhawati and Padma Desai, India: Planning
for Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press,
1970), 118.
13Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Development Planning: The
Indian Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981),
ch. 1.
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The achievement of self-reliance has been an important
objective of economic planning in India.14 The term itself
is used in two senses.

In one sense, self-reliance has

meant that development must be financed as far as possible
from domestic savings, avoiding excessive dependence upon
external assistance, an inward looking strategy.

Self-

reliance has also meant a conscious effort to develop a
broad domestic production base and indigenous technological
capacity, both of which were felt to be essential
requirements for building a strong industrialized economy,
an import substitution strategy.

And, all this was

ultimately to lead to social and economic justice.

Planning, Policy and Policy Instruments

The Planning Commission was established in India on
March 15, 195G.

In the period since, it has formulated

eight successive Five-Year Development Plans.15 The
planning process has been 'rolling' in that there has been
no abrupt or drastic reversal of ideology or strategy.
14For a more detailed discussion of the objectives
of planning see Robert E.B. Lucas and Gustav F.
Papanek, The Indian Economy: Recent Developments and
Future Prospects (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), ch.
16.
15There are two exceptions. In the wake of the
serious food crisis of the 1960s, 1966-68 saw annual
revisions to the Third Plan. Also, in 1977-79, the
first non-Congress government broke away from the fifth
Congress party plan. These two gaps in otherwise
uninterrupted five-year plan periods have been labelled
'plan holidays'.
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There have been evaluations of policy and policy instruments
and corresponding reappraisals of plan targets.

Provision

has been made to allow for such adjustments in annual
budgets formulated within the framework of the overall
plan.16
The broad objectives of industrial policy that have
emerged from these strategies have been periodically
reiterated in the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948,
1956 and 1973 and in the Industrial Policy statement of
1980.17 The objectives included (1) increasing production
and productivity, especially in the priority sectors, (2)
encouraging small scale industries with a view to generating
more employment and fostering entrepreneurial talents, (3)
bringing about regionally balanced industrial growth, (4)
preventing concentration of economic power by the control of
monopolies and 'large' houses and, (5) controlling foreign
investment in domestic industry.
The policy instruments deployed to guide
industrialization into desired patterns included both
domestic and foreign instruments.18 The domestic policy

16Features of Indian economic planning in fact
correspond to those of Myrdal's 'ideal' plan. See
Myrdal, 1878-1896.
17Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation Since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 147.
18For a detailed description see Bhagwati and
Desai, ch. 13 & 14.
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instruments consisted mainly of a powerful and comprehensive
industrial licensing system, occasionally combined with
prices and distributional controls.19 The rapid growth of
the public sector also provided a significant means of
influencing the pattern of new investments in the targeted
direction.

These policies were buttressed by policies

relating to trade and payments.

Industrial targets were

supported by quantitative restrictions which automatically
shielded domestic production from foreign competition? and
the framework of import and export policies, in turn,
provided the incentives which affected non-targeted
industrialization.

Public Sector Performance

The public sector, as discussed above, occupies a
hegemonic position in the Indian economy and its performance
is central to the economic and political character that
evolved in the country.

It is important therefore, to take

a short digression here and briefly discuss the outcome of
state-guided industrialization.

In keeping with the

Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, the scope of the
19There has been a vigilant evaluation of these
instruments and, in the late sixties review of the
industrial licensing system showed that the existing
apparatus under the Industries Development and
Regulation Act (1951) was not sufficiently effective in
attaining its objectives. The Monopoly and Restrictive
Trade Practices Act (MRTP) was enforced in 1970 to
further check the expansion of large industrial houses.
Ibid., 265-272.

public sector has been steadily increased in the plan
periods since.20 This is evident from the investment and
employment statistics shown in Tables I and II? they have a
distinct anti-private sector bias.

In spite of this, as

figures on savings and capital formation suggest (see Table
III), public sector performance has consistently fallen
behind that of the private sector.
Table I
Compound Growth Rates of Gross Fixed Investment
Fixed Investment
Private
Total
Public
(in percentages)
1956-57
1959-60
1966-67
1966-67
1967-68
1967-68

to
to
to
to
to
to

1965-66
1965-66
1975-76
1979-80
1975-76
1979-80

6.1
9.0
2.9
4.1
2.8
4.0

10.0
9.9
3.3
5.2
4.2
5.8

3.2
8.2
2.6
3.1
1.9
2.8

Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid--Sixties (Delhi: Oxford Universi
Press, 1985).
Table II
Employment in the Organized Sector of the Indian
Economy
Private Sector
1961
1971
1981

41.7
39.3
32.3

Public Sector
(in percentages)
58.3
61.4
67.7

Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University
20In 1960 there were 63 public sector undertakings.
This increased to 1571 by 1980.
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Press, 1985).
Criticism of the performance of public sector
enterprises can be grouped most conveniently into those
relating to investment or creation of capacity and those
relating to output or capacity utilization.21 On the
investment side, three major criticisms are that the actual
costs of projects have by far exceeded the original
estimates, that the projects have taken very much longer to
complete and bring into operation than originally planned
and, that they have embodied inappropriate technological or
product mix.
Table III
National Savings and Capital Formation by the
Government and Private Sectors.

Gross Domestic
Savings
Govt.
Pvt.
1950-55
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
1970-75
1975-80

18
15
24
17
18
21

82
85
76
83
82
79

Gross Domestic
Capital Formation
Govt.
Pvt.
(in percentages)
32
41
49
42
41
46

68
59
51
58
59
54

Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1985).
On the operational side, there are two criticisms of
21Pramit Chaudhari, The Indian Economy: Poverty
and Development. (London: Crosby Lockwood Staples), ch.
6.
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fundamental importance.

One is that low capacity

utilization has failed to utilize optimally the scarce
capital resources of the economy.

The low, and declining

capacity utilization ratios are shown in Table IV.

Second,

Table IV
Capacity Utilization Ratios
Industry Group

1960

1970
1980
(in ;
percentages)

Basic Goods
Capital Goods
Intermediate Goods
Consumer Goods

86.0
85.9
89.3
86.6

82.0
66.4
81.9
82.2

77.2
62.4
82.5
80.1

Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1985).

the public sector industries have failed to make profits and
have in fact accumulated substantial losses over the years,
as can be seen in Table V.

As a result, instead of being a

source of re-investable surplus, India's public sector
enterprises have become a source of negative savings in the
economy.

Failure of the public sector has caused severe

shortages in the core sectors.

Repercussions in the rest of

the economy have resulted in a continued neglect of consumer
goods and sluggish agricultural production, jeopardizing the
entire development effort.

22
T a b le V

Gross Public Sector Savings in the Economy
Net Savings
Consumption
Financial
Non Financial
of fixed
enterprises enterprises.*
capital
(in Rs. crores)
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80
1980-81

52
71
86
97
125
134
173
214
224
290
337
394
445
361
553
667
814
977
1091
1297
1571

20
21
23
31
36
66
37
54
36
53
84
93
145
204
336
327
503
561
682
710
865

-

-9
-24
-23
-5
-23
-16
-38
-59
-57
-34
-12
-73
-84
-84
83
105
98
234
240
337
681

(net)(11)
(-3)
(26)
(13)
(50)
(“1)
(-5)
(-21)
(19)
(72)
(20)
(61)
(120)
(419)
(222)
(601)
(327)
(442)
(373)
(184)

Source: Isher Ahluwalia, Industrial Growth in India:
Stagnation since the Mid-Sixties (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1985).
Non financial enterprises includes all public sector
undertakings other than banking and financial institutions.
The 'core1 industries would come under this category.

The State as an Autonomous Actor

In developing countries where private capital markets
and insurance markets are inadequately developed, the state
is the only agency that can provide capital and underwrite
the risks involved in large initial investment ventures in

23

the early stages of industrialization.22 In India, the
elites who inherited power at the time of independence
shared a coherent ideology; they enjoyed enormous prestige
and a unified sense of purpose about the desirability of
using state intervention to promote national economic
development.

They redirected and restructured the economy

and in the process, put pressure on existing prominent
social and business classes.

As the aura of special

legitimacy derived from participation in the freedom
movement waned (and as some of the widely respected leaders
of the struggle for independence passed away), demands from
vested interests could less easily be ignored.

And today,

"the autonomy of the Indian state is reflected more often in
its regulatory and patronage-dispensing than developmental
role."23
Robert Wade illustrates how selective incentives and
complex understandings work among India's elite in his study
of the pressures exerted by money and influence in the
irrigation department.24 Wade suggests that there are two
ways to secure an irrigation contract, for example.

First,

bribe the local MIA. (Member, Legislative Assembly at the

22Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of
Development in India (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),
ch. 5.
23Ibid. , 39.
24Robert Wade, "Money-go-round," Economist. 4 May
1991, p. S9.

state level) to use his influence on engineers in the
administration.

The amount of money involved depends on the

scale of the contract.

If the stakes are high and high

level of authority is required to exert influence, the
amounts in question will be high as well.

The alternative

would be to pay the engineers in the bureaucracy 'rent1 of
post which gives them access to the appropriate official
authority.

Once again, the amounts involved depend on size

of the contract and the level of bureaucrats and politicians
whose cooperation is needed.

In either case, for every

irrigation contract, contractors, bureaucrats and
politicians have a clear understanding and network to
distribute the 'selective incentives'.

In fact, such

'complex understanding' among elites is estimated to support
a parallel black economy during 1973-1982 of as high as half
of the official GNP, with an annual compound rate of growth
of 18%.25
Aside from the individual economic incentives that
drive the 'complex understandings' in the system, there is
also a political and partisan incentive involved, arising
from the strategic requirement of funds in conducting a
successful political campaign in a large democracy.
The infiltration of the official machinery has been
made easier by the government's decision in 1968 to ban
25Report of the Wanchoo Panel cited in K. N.
Kabra, India's Black Economy and Maldevelooment (New
Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1986), 67.

business concerns [from giving donations to political
parties.

The imm4diate motive of the Congress(I) party

government was to deny funds to the opposition, notably, the
Swantantra Party, which commanded a good deal of support
from the industrialists in Bombay and Ahmedabad.

But, more

significant, it was not accompanied by any attempt to set up
an alternative method of financing political activity and
meeting election expenditures.26 As a result, with the
ever increasing needs for funds, all parties were forced to
f.

go back to the very same business concern and trade and
#

industrial associations to ask for funds but this time in
black money.

The move allowed the ruling party virtually to

blackmail business concerns into meeting its demands on the
one hand, and to set the law enforcement agencies on any
concern which it suspected of giving funds generously to an
opposition party.

In the search for influence, this gave a

decided edge to those whose control of their company's
finances was so complete that they could raise black money
easily: closely held Indian family concerns.27 In fact,
Prem Shankar Jha argues that the tirade against foreign
equity participation arises as much from this concern as
from any avowed leftist ideology or fear of foreign

26Prem Shankaf Jha, India: Political Economy of
Stagnation (Bombay: Oxford University Press,1980),
114.
27In the 1980s, only four of the top twenty-five
companies were foreign firms.
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domination.28
The governments apathy towards taxing the trading
community springs too, at least in part, from its knowledge
that when a manufacturer gives a donation in black it
usually does so by collecting black from its selling agents.
An illustration of this is the students revolt in Gujarat in
February 1974.

It was sparked by allegations of deals

struck by a Congress Chief Minister with wholesale traders
in edible oil which allowed them to rig the prices of
groundnut oil in exchange for contributions to the state
Congress party.29
Action in self-interest by the state at both the
individual and partisan levels has had two

significant

implications for the economy in direct contradiction to what
planned development was to achieve.

The first has to do

with the concentration of wealth and power in the private
sector, which has been a specific target in all the
Industrial Policy Resolutions.

The second involves the

unprecedented growth of the service sector.
In 1976 the top 20 business houses in India were
reported to have controlled nearly two-thirds of the total
productive capital in the private corporate sector.30 This

28Jha, 115.
29Indian Express (New Delhi), 20 February 1974,
p. 1.
30Bardhan, 105.
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concentration of assets has not diminished in recent years
as even the pretence of government control over monopoly
houses was more gr less given up by the mid-70s.31 Another
feature of the organization of industrial capital is the
substantial expansion of small-scale industry and a possible
increase in the incidence of subcontracting.32 Such
arrangements not only help large companies avoid excise
taxes and labor laws under the special provisions set up for
cottage or small scale industry, they also line up for them
a numerically strong vertical alliance that may prove useful
in putting pressure on the government.
The intermediate class has grown stronger both
absolutely and in relation to other classes and over time
has used its growing economic strength to capture political
power by means of bribery and political donations in black
money to the ruling parties at the center and the states.33
This service sector consists of those involved in retail,
trade and transport.

In his definition of modern economic

growth, Simon Kuznets has argued that only in mature,
developed economies does the tertiary sector compete with
agriculture and industry for the dominant share of national

31Gita Piramal, "Industry Feels Worried," Financial
Times (New York), 26 June 1992, p. XVI.
32Bardhan, 42.
33Atul Kohli, India1s Democracy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), 15.
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income.34 In India, the service sector accounts for 39.6%
of GNP

while the share of agriculture is 37% and that of

manufacturing 18%.35
In the Indian context, a prosperous service sector is
parasitic in nature.

Most of its members actually gain from

shortages that are caused by economic stagnation or natural
disasters.

They have the capacity to shift the burden of

these shortages onto other segments of society by, for
example, raising transport and distribution margins in an
economy.

In consumer goods, such an artificial hike in

prices poses a serious dilemma for the poor.

Their demand

for food is not translated into a market demand because it
is not backed by the ability to pay, especially at inflated
prices.

They have simply been left out of the market

process while the economy has been erroneously considered
self-sufficient in food-grains for over a decade.

As A. K.

Sen points out this self-sufficiency is only a market
phenomenon, it completely leaves out those most in need but
without adequate purchasing power to have any entitlement in
the market.36

34Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate.
Structure and Spread (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966) .
35Financial Times (New York), 26 June 1992, p. II.
36Amartya Kumar Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay
on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Claredon Press,
1981).
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Preservation of the Status Quo

In contemporary India, where the overwhelming
majority are illiterates or drop-outs at the primary
education level, the educated elite enjoy a high scarcity
value for their education and profession.

Further, the

nature of state-directed development gave enormous strategic
and bargaining advantages to officials with authority over
development funds and influence over legislation.

And such

license-giving powers at various levels of the bureaucracy
have made the rewards for corruption quite substantial.

The

bigger the rewards, the fiercer is the resistance of the
'privilegensia1 to reform.

The substantial benefits that

economic planning affords them has made bureaucrats and
politicians reluctant to relinquish control of the closely
administered economy.

A self-interested state has been very

successful in guarding its 'commanding heights'.
Like the strongly and oft-professed socialist ideology,
official declarations of liberalization in the economy have
been unenthusiastically implemented.

In a recent country

survey, David Housego found that "Prime Minister Narashimha
Rao's failure as a reformer stem from his reluctance to
confront the powerful lobbies that have long resisted change
in India."37 Significantly, he has had to put off promised
reductions in the size of the civil service and the public

37David Housego, "Chances are slipping away'" Financial
Times (New York), 26 June 1992, p. I.

30

sector.
There is further evidence of interest protection in the
manner in which the ranks of the state have been limited by
directing educational investment away from the masses.

A.

K. Sen has presented persuasive evidence of the elitist
nature of the Indian education system by highlighting the
remarkable success of higher education and relative neglect
of elementary education.38 Achievements in improving
literacy and primary school enrollment have been
unimpressive.

Literacy rates have increased from 24% to

merely 36% in two decades (literacy among women remains as
low as 20% in rural areas) and two-third of those enrolled
in primary schools still drop out after only six years of
education.39 The government has done little in terms of
investment to improve the situation, between 1970 and 1990,
expenditure on education has been increased from 2.5% to 3%
($10 per capita) of GNP.40

38Higher education enrollment as a proportion of
population aged 20-24 is 8%. However, the overall
literacy rate is only 36%. In neighboring Sri Lanka, a
country molded by the less elitist Buddhist tradition,
the corresponding statistics are 1% and 85%
respectively.
39In the same period, Malaysia increased literacy
from 23% to 60%. See Economist, 4 May 1992, p. S8.
40In comparison, Malaysia spends 8.5% of GNP ($156
a head) on education. Ibid., p. S15.
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Conclusion

State guided industrialization in India was intended to
foster a fast growing egalitarian society.

To this end, the

extent and nature of autonomy the state has reserved for
itself prompted Rudolph and Rudolph to label it the "third
actor" in the economy (in addition to the usual components
of economic analysis: the owners and managers of the means
of production and organized labor).41 This advantage could
have been exercised effectively to persuade adherence to a
socialist ideology and the ultimate realization of planned
development.

However, Indian planners were not alert to the

serious constraints on policy and implementation that could
be posed by a failure of the large-scale, irreversible
investments in the public sector and the articulate
interests of the elite classes.
The failure of the public sector in fulfilling its
leading role in industry has caused severe supply side
%

constraints and opened up potential black markets and
illegal profits for shortage brokers.

Restrictions on

private initiative in industry in the presence of a large,
unsatisfied demand for industrial and consumer goods has
encouraged the violation of industrial regulations by large
firms and a thriving black-marketeering practice in the
service sector.

41Rudolph and Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), 388.
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The most crucial oversight was with respect to those
who constitute the state, politicians and bureaucrats, who
have willingly used the authority vested in them to promote
illegal activities and who have been reluctant to make any
policy revisions that might threaten their selective
incentives.

Jha argues that government servants and

politicians have reserved for themselves more rights than
any other section of society enjoys, while adding the least
to the material productivity of the economy.42
Jha further suggests that as a result of illegal
exercise of authority, there appears to be little balance
between rights anci obligation in society.43 Or, As Olson
might have put it, the incentive to produce is diminished
while the incentive to seek a larger share of what is
produced increases.

And, far from being the benevolent

state looking after the interests of the under-privileged,
the question being asked of the Indian government today is
"is it the law that rules, or black money?."44 In chapter
III, an analysis of the emergence and nurturing of elitist
interests in agriculture will further illustrate this point.

42Jha, 123.
43Ibid. , 124.
44Clive Crook, Economist. 4 May 1991, p. S15.

Chapter III
The Agriculture Sector

In Arthur Lewis' opinion "if one were asked to pick a
single factor as the common cause for a low rate of economic
growth, it would have to be the absence of a vigorous
agricultural policy".45 This chapter explains the limited
success of state intervention in altering the power
structure in the agrarian sector.

Three important policies

aimed at redistributing productive assets and establishing
economic and political equity in the rural economy are
examined: panchavati rai. land reform and the Green
Revolution.

The analysis reveals that attempts at agrarian

reform have actually provided additional selective
incentives to the established network of social and
political interests and these incentives have been actively
pursued by the elites.

The result has been the

strengthening of the existing differentials in the community
at the cost of the rural poor, the group which was targeted
to benefit from reform policy.

Political Change: Panchayati Raj

The First Plan recommended establishing a new
45W. A. Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations. 1870-1913
(London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1978), 241.
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development agency, the panchavats (councils), to frame and
coordinate the planning and implementation of rural
development projects.46 In fact, the Plan gave the
panchavats statutory responsibility for developing all
resources for the rural areas.47 Important among these
responsibilities is the enforcement of land reform measures
and the disbursement of development funds, a matter in which
the panchavats enjoy nearly complete discretion.
Panchavats are organized at three levels: village (gram
panchavats), block (mandal parishads) and district (zilla
parishads). The village panchayat is constituted on the
principles of universal membership and adult suffrage in an
attempt to include all families in community development,
regardless of caste or economic standing.

Elections to the

higher councils are indirect, with the village panchayats
electing representatives to the mandal parishads and they in
46For a detailed account of Panchayati Raj
(council rule) see First Five Year Plan. Also see Guy
Hunter, The Administration of Agricultural Development:
Lessons from India (London: Oxford University Press,
1970).
47These responsibilities include (1)framing a
production plan; (2)preparing budget estimates to carry
out the plan; (3)acting as a channel for government
assistance; (4)enforcing minimum standards of
cultivation; (5)bringing wasteland under cultivation;
(6)arranging for cultivation of land not managed by
owners; (7)organizing voluntary labor for community
work; (8)making arrangements for cooperative management
of land and other resources in the village according to
prevailing land management legislation; and (9)
assisting in the implementation of land reforms.
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turn electing the members of the zilla parishads.
Panchavati Rai (council rule) is intended to ultimately
shift the balance of economic and political power away from
the upper castes towards the low-status peasant majority.
Francine Frankel has argued that in appointing panchayats as
vehicles of democratic transformation at the grassroots,
planners seriously misunderstood the potential of
reconstructing the village as the basic unit of social
action in rural areas.48 She argues that in the more selfcontained and interdependent subsistence village economy, a
network of patron-client ties bound together the highlandowning castes and low-caste tenants and laborers.

This

village cohesion, 'even at Independence, showed signs of
erosion as a result of growing class differentiation and
economic disparities.

The more affluent members of the

dominant landowning class had turned their resources to
profitable new opportunities for participating in commercial
farming provided by the wider market economy.

They found

fewer compelling reasons, either of economic interest or
social status, t6 use their surpluses for meeting the
traditional obligations of a self-sufficient village.49
i

48Francine Frankel, India's Political Economy.
1947-1977 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978), ch. 13.
49For a detailed account of the disintegration of
the traditional rural economy with the introduction of
free trade under colonial rule, see Dharma Kumar, ed.,
The Cambridge Economic History of India (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), section II.
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The much larger numbers of marginal farmers and
landless laborers, still splintered along traditional
allegiances to family, caste and faction, have found it
difficult to present a united front against the larger
landowners in the contest for control over the new community
development bodies.

Many landless and land-poor families

i

have been faced with an economic crisis that could be
contained only by safeguarding even attenuated dependency
relationships with more affluent members of the land owning
class.50
In this environment, the richer landowners, already
better placed in the village social hierarchy, have had
little difficulty manipulating a fragmented and dependent
peasantry to maintain control of the oanchavat
institutions.51 From this vantage point, they are able to
50'Economic crisis' is in reference to the
different impact new opportunities of a wider market
economy have on a village community. The potential for
profits is increased for the wealthy peasants and
dominant classes through participation in a larger
market system. The poor are without the resources to
take advantage of or, guard against, the impersonal
market forces that fluctuate demand and price. This
makes their small earnings even more precarious. See
Joel Migdal, Peasants. Politics and Revolution:
Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the
Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974) ,
ch. 1.
51Data available for Rajasthan, the first state to
implement Panchayati Raj in 1959, revealed trends
typical of an emerging all-India pattern. Compared to
estimates showing over 68% of the rural population in
Rajasthan having an annual income of less than Rs.1000,
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dictate the distribution of credit, improved methods of
cultivation and marketing services. Their interest in
augmenting their own resources has been assisted by the
legislative provision of indirect elections to higher levels
of the panchavati system which has allowed them to maintain
a strong influence throughout the political hierarchy.
One visible effect of this expanding power is the
growing ability of the district bosses in the Congress
Party to insist on choosing the party's candidates for
the state legislature and thus securing their influence
over state legislation.52 Another is the increase in^
the number of agriculturists in the Lok Sabha at the
center from 10.7% in 1947 to 40.1% in the 1980 (see
Table VI below). Evidence shows that their growing
power has been consolidated all the way to the central
government over the years.

They have used this strong

position to bargain for high procurement rates and low
fertilizer prices for the agricultural sector.

85% of all presidents of village panchayats enjoyed an
annual income of Rs.1000 or more. Although Scheduled
Castes and Tribes accounted for approximately one
fourth of the population of the state, only ten village
panchavat presidents out of 7,394 belong to these
communities. See David C. Potter, Government in Rural
India: An Introduction to Contemporary District
Administration (London: London School of Economics and
Political Science, 1964), 53-55.
52R. Roy, "Selection of Congress Candidates" in
Economic and Political Weekly (New Delhi), 18 Febuary
1967, 409.
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Table VI
Occupational Background of
Congress Legislators in Lok Sabha
Occupational
Category

1947

1957

1967

Agriculture

10.8

24.1

36.8

36.3

40.1

Business

10.6

11.2

5.1

3.8

7.0

50.4
(32.6)
(17.8)

30.4
(23.2)
(7.1)

35.9
(22.2)
(13.7)

32.2
(20.1)
(12.1)

30.2
(20.9)
(9.3)

14.8

28.1

17.0

25. 3

20.1

Service

9.9

3.1

2.9

1.0

1.7

Others

3.5

3.1

2.3

1.4

0.9

All Professions
-Law
-Other
Public Work

Total

100

100

100

1977
1980
(in percentages)

100

100

Source: Parliamentary Study (New Delhi: Government of India
Publication, 1982)

As part of the package of incentives and support
extended to the agricultural sector to encourage increased
market production, the government has placed subsidies on
the price of inputs and guarantees a minimum price on
agricultural products by promising to purchase all grain at
a floor price announced before each season.

A strong

farmers* lobby at the center has compelled the government to
over-subsidize inputs and over-compensate agricultural
procurement.53 And any move to revise such policy, like
53See P. R. Dubhashi, Policy and Performance:
Agricultural and Rural Development in Post-Independent
India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986), ch. 8.
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the recent attempt to reduce fertilizer subsidy by the
persent Prime Minister, is blocked by the strong
agricultural lobby at all levels of government.54
The Nehru government's socialist ideology envisaged
panchavats as the vehicle for "democratic social
transformation... [and] a way to reverse the trend toward
individualism and class division."55 However, under the
existing socio-political conditions, the politics of
accommodation represented by Panchavati Rai actually
operated to strengthen the bargaining powers of the dominant
castes.

They have been able to strike advantageous

alliances with the external sources of power in the ruling
party and administration, which in turn further bolstered
their strategic position as intermediaries between the landpoor peasantry and the wider economic and political system.

Social and Economic Change: Land Reform

At independence, the most important productive asset in
rural India, land, was controlled by various contractual
agreements between the British and the local landowners.56
The common framework was the appointment of zamindars or
landlords with assigned tracts of land from which they were
responsible for collecting revenue for the British. In
54David Housego, Financial Times, p. I.
55First Five Year Plan. 164.
56Dharma Kumar, section II.
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return, they received a fixed portion or amount of total
yield and were free to enter into any leasing or cropsharing arrangement with tenant farmers who actually
cultivated the land.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the First Plan
initiated land reform with the slogan 'land to the tiller'
and a strategy which had two main features.57 First, it
placed a ceiling on individual holdings.

Second, it gave

tenants the right to buy land held in excess of the ceiling
at fixed rates of compensation to the owner.

This scheme

had loopholes that consistently but lawfully left out the
actual tiller of the soil from the redistribution process.
Most significantly, ceilings were imposed on individual
rather than family holdings.

Further, the state paid a high

rate of compensation for official acguisition of land over
this limit, rates which tenant farmers found hard to match.
The land reform policy, as a result, permitted
zamindars to reclaim land up to the ceiling permitted to
each member of the family from the tenant who had previously
cultivated it.

Any surplus was sold to smaller farmers who,

after counting the heads in their families, found they could
still buy a good deal of land under the terms of the law.
Finally, what little land was left after these adjustments
was taken over by the erstwhile middlemen who had previously
collected land rents from the peasants on behalf of the
57J h a , 111.
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zamindars. They were almost the only other people who could
afford to pay the high rates of compensation fixed by the
government.

To safeguard against claims of hereditary

tenurial rights, these three groups simply expelled all
tenants, reemploying them as agricultural labor.
Data indicate that land for redistribution to marginal
farmers has come from all other segments, contribution being
an increasing function of the size of holding (see Table
VII). Land reform has halved the share of large farms in
total holdings and increased holdings at the bottom end of
the scale to over 50%.

However, statistics for operational

holdings are not so favorable for marginal farmers; their

Table VII
Landholding
Size of holdings
(hectares)
Marginal holdings
(below 1.0)
Small holdings
(1.0-2.0)
Semi-medium holdings
(2.0-4.0)
Medium holdings
(4.0-10.0)
Large holdings
(10 and above)

Holdings percent

Operational
holdings (area %)
1953-54
1976-77

1953-54

1976-77

39.1

54.6

5.4

10.9

20.9

18.1

10. 0

12.8

19.7

14.3

18. 6

19.8

14.4

10.6

29. 3

30. 3

5.9

3.0

36.6

26.5

Source: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India (Cambridge:
University Press, 1989), p. 273.

lands add up to only 10.9% of the total.

The combination of

these two effects implies that reform has simply transformed
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a fraction of poor landless agricultural labor to land poor
marginal farmers, still earning only a subsistence income.
And, this earning invariably has to be supplemented by
continued farm labor as marginal holdings are most
susceptible to being economically infeasible (particularly
in terms of irrigation in case of monsoon failure). Large
and medium holdings, although their share has fallen (from
65.9% to 56.8%), still account for the majority of
operational agricultural area.
Thus, land reform in India, rather than protecting and
promoting the cause of the tiller, allowed the consolidation
of existing social and economic interests.

Zamindars. the

middlemen they had appointed and wealthy farmers now formed
a new class of well-to-do owner-cultivators, reducing their
tenants to marginal farmers or landless agricultural labor.

Technological Change: The Green Revolution

In the 1960s India faced two major food shortages that
necessitated the import of substantial volumes of grain,
depleting scarce foreign exchange reserves.

This situation

threatened the program of self-sufficiency and import
substitution.

Also, by the late 19 60s, it was clear that

the land redistribution policy was not going to provide the
solution to rural inequality.

The Green Revolution offered

a technical approach to the problems of an agrarian economy
with low land-man ratios and low productivity.

43

The basic characteristic of the new technology is the
biological combination of a number of inputs which are
complementary to one another.58 The combination of the
joint inputs of hybrid seed, fertilizer and water yields
much larger volumes of output by increasing yield per acre
and allowing multiple cropping.

Correctly implemented, the

Green Revolution technology is neutral to scale; output per
unit would not differ between large and small farms.

There

are however economic characteristics of the new technology
that make it less than optimal to small and marginal farmers
in the Indian political setting.
Crucial to the success of the high yield variety (HYV)
seed is the timely and adequate application of water and
fertilizer and, pesticide in areas prone to infestation.
For the capital-poor smaller farmer, the new technological
package is more expensive albeit more productive.
has placed subsidies on both credit and inputs.

The state
But, the

regulations governing rural credit agencies set up to
channel funds towards agricultural development virtually
rule out giving credit to farmers with less than 7-10 acres
of land.59 As Table VII suggests, this is probably less
than 10% of total holdings.

The practice of calling for

58B. M. Bhatia, Indian Agriculture: A Policy
Perspective (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988)
ch. 6.
59Pranab Bardhan, Land. Labor and Rural Poverty.
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984) , 86.
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land as security, instead of offering loans secured by a
lien on the crop, make credit inaccessible to all without a
title to land than can be pledged.

Private lenders, on the

other hand, charge exorbitant rates of interest.

Also,

small farms are more sensitive to risk because they have
smaller margins of savings to fall back on.

However,

government policy has done little to underwrite such risk.
So far as subsidized inputs are concerned, the elite classes
receive preferential allotment by virtue of their domination
of the panchayats, as discussed before.
Further, if yields from multiple cropping are to be
maximized, the time interval between harvesting and planting
is so short as to make it necessary to use tractors for
preparation of land for sowing.

Therefore, there is a

strong tendency for the new technology to be associated with
mechanization.

This tendency has been strengthened by the

government policy of underpricing of tractors and harvesters
and the easy access large farmers have to subsidized
agricultural credit.

However, with the existing abundant

labor force and high unemployment, mechanization can pose
serious employment problems in India, the most immediate
threat being to agricultural labor.
The success of India1s Green Revolution has been
extremely limited in its spread, in terms of both area and
grain.

It has been largely restricted to wheat growing in

the north and north-west of the country and to the rice

growing areas in the south.

These regions have ideal,

almost laboratory conditions, including the most fertile
lands and an abundant natural supply of water.

Farmers here

were prosperous initially and required little
infrastructural support in adopting the new technology.

But

even under these ideal natural conditions, government policy
and policy implementation have prevented the Green
Revolution from being profitable to the small and marginal
farmers and hence being truly neutral to scale.
Table VIII is an international comparison of paddy
yields under the Green Revolution technology among twelve
Asian countries.60 Paddy/fertilizer ratio indicates input
efficiency, the number of units of output produced by one
unit of input.

Green Revolution technology has increased

this ratio in all the countries except three.

(Of these

three, Taiwan and Myanmar already had high ratios).

601Paddy' refers to the entire plant before the
rice grains are separated from it.
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Table VIII
How green was your Revolution?
Paddy/
fertilizer
ratio
1976
1981

Paddy
Fertilizer
yields
applied per
(kg/ha)
hectare (kg/ha)
1981
1976
1981
1976

India

0.17

0.37

32

34

1,637

South Korea

0.65

0.84

311

351

5,966

Taiwan

1.25

0.75

205

287

4,539

Indonesia

0.40

0.62

57

74

2,784

Malaysia

0.49

0.56

97

92

2,733

Philippines

0.28

0.27

29

32

1,821

Thailand

0.24

0.30

11

18

1,780

Bangladesh

0.51

0.57

11

44

1,784

Myanmar

0.55

0.55

9

17

1,799

Nepal

0.33

0.45

8

9

1,891

Pakistan

0.27

0.28

46

53

2, 347

Sri Lanka

0. 60

0.83

65

77

1,971

1, 962
(+325)
841
5,
(-125)*
953
4,
(+414)
3, 493
(+709)
3, 225
(+492)
2, 362
(+541)
952
If
(+272)
955
1/
(+171)
2, 942
(+1143)
2, 000
(+109)
604
2,
(+257)
646
2,
(+675)

a case of decreasing returns to scale.
Source: Economist. 4 May, 1991.

In India this increase has been substantial in absolute
terms but because of the starting point, fertilizer
efficiency remains low relative to other countries.
Fertilizer applied per hectare indicates input intensity;
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the extent of fertilizer use.

In India, fertilizer use has

not increased significantly at all, neither absolutely nor
relative to other countries.

As a result, paddy yields in

India have improved from the worst performance to third from
bottom but only marginally so.
Evidence suggests that for Green Revolution technology
to be successful, use of the new and efficient fertilizers
must be combined with a high or increased intensity of use.
This is evident from the increases in yield achieved by
Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Taiwan.

For

countries with yields below that in India, (Pakistan, Nepal
and Thailand) either input effectiveness or input intensity
or, both, have been significantly lower.61 Thus there is
evidence to conclude that the potential gains from Green
Revolution technology in India have been substantially
limited by the failure to increase fertilizer intensity to
ensure input effectiveness.

A major factor here has been

the pre-emptying of credit and inputs by the rural elite and
the consequent curtailment of increased distribution and use
of fertilizers.

61There appears to be only one exception to the
rule. The Philippines has achieved a higher increase
in paddy yields with both a lower paddy/fertilizer
ratio and with lower amounts of fertilizer applied per
hectare. Bangladesh is the other exception but is not
considered here because of its special circumstance of
persistent flood problems that effects paddy yields.
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Conclusion

In India, reform in agricultural policy has
unquestionably strengthened the interests of the dominant
class.

It is not so much that these people join the elite

when they establish themselves economically or politically,
but that they typically come from that stratum already.
Using their social standing, the dominant class promoted
itself to positions of political consequence in the
panchavati rai system.

Pre-emption of incentives extended

to the sector at every level of social participation was
facilitated by the panchavats being responsible for the
distribution of development funds.

As the new Green

Revolution technology made agriculture a lucrative business,
government credit, subsidies, inputs and guaranteed prices
were pursued even more actively.

Loopholes in the land

reform policy prevented any significant redistribution of
land in favor of the poor.

Thus, the small and marginal

farmer, with little physical capital and no social standing
or political power, lost out in the race to secure the
benefits of agricultural reform inspired by their situation
and targeted specifically at them.

Chapter IV
Conclusion

From his study of post-World War II western nations,
Mancur Olson concluded that groups with access to selective
incentives would try to capture a larger share of the
national income.

The accumulation of distributional

coalitions, he argued further, increases the complexity of
regulation, the role of government, the complexity of
understanding and thus changes the direction of social
evolution.
This thesis has extended Olson's theory to gauge the
susceptibility of Third World democracies to the sort of
coalition activity Olson describes.

Evidence from the post

independence development experience in India shows that
society was indeed vulnerable to the economically
debilitating effects of interest group and government
interaction.
While the sequence of events in Olson's theory do not
apply directly to the Indian case, all the operational
attributes are clearly identifiable.

In India,

independence, democracy and industrialization all occurred
simultaneously.

Nationalist leaders,

democratically

elected after independence, framed a detailed economic plan
for development.

Spearheaded by state monopolized
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industrialization, growth was to be egalitarian and
ultimately, establish a socialist way of life.

This was the

direction society was given.
The objectives and strategy of state-guided development
necessitated a vast amount of legislation to monitor the
economy and to ensure it kept on course.

The power to

frame, implement and revise this complex system of
regulations was bestowed on elected politicians and a large
army of bureaucrats.

At the time of independence, these

were the educated social elites of society.

They did not

join the ranks of the elites by gaining an education but,
typically, they were born into socially high classes.
Planned development with its complexity of regulation has
given the educated elite the opportunity to earn 'rent1 for
their social standing by the illegal use of the authority
entrusted to them.

This is the 'selective incentive* these

'specialists' have access to.
The private sector in India has found itself caught
between complex government regulation on the one hand and
excess demand in the market on the other.

Much of the

legislation arising from economic planning was to curb the
growth of private enterprize in favor of the more desirable
public sector enterprises.

However, the failure of the

latter to perform any where near the expected level has
caused severe shortages in the economy.

The private sector

has used this as an incentive, profiting richly from an
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extensive and thriving blackmarket in essential goods, both
intermediary and consumer.

Further, it has influenced the

implementation of the regulations against such practices by
funding political activities or paying 'rent' to
'specialists* to manipulate the law.

The state has been

able to preserve these selective incentives by continuing to
endorse close regulation of the economy and, by biasing
education policy toward higher education and thereby
restricting entry into its ranks.
In agriculture, economic planning placed the
distribution of development funds at the discretion of local
elected authorities.

This has been the greatest selective

incentive for interest groups in this sector.

Social elites

have used their standing in village communities to capture
political support and then proceeded to pre-empt subsidies
assigned for the rural sector.

To preserve the status-quo,

they have successfully used their growing economic and
political strength to promote themselves to higher levels of
government and lobby even more effectively for their
interests.
These are the 'complex understandings' the elites in
India have come to in order to preserve and share the
benefits of their positions.

From this has resulted an

alteration in the pattern of incentives.

The incentive to

produce is diminished, while the reward to seek a greater
share of what is produced by exploiting politics and
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bureaucracy has become greater.

And, all this has, as

Olson's theory would have us predict, deflected the
direction of a society's evolution.

In India, the

arrangement of power and authority among the elites has
consistently left out the poor majority from the benefits of
increased government intervention in the economy.

In spite

of a strongly professed socialist ideology, the elites have
been fittest in terms of social, political and economic
strength and have pre-empted concessions and incentives
extended by the planning process at the expense of the poor
majority.
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